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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for here-
in," the court concluded, "it would definitely appear that the
Criminal Code does not provide for a combination of inchoate
offenses resulting in such a crime as an attempt to conspire to
commit simple burglary."5
While recognizing the general rule that one who has been
tried in a court of competent jurisdiction cannot, without having
appealed from the judgment of the lower court, be released from
custody by habeas corpus,0 the court held that such relief is avail-
able where the sentence imposed is for a non-existent crime.
"Such a sentence obviously deprives the accused of his liberty
without any basis or color of authority and without due process
of law . .. no court has jurisdiction to commit a person for the
doing of an act which is not an offense under the law and for
which the law does not direct that he be committed. In doing so
the court acts without Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae and its ac-
tion is wholly void. . . . the remedy of one committed under such
a sentence is by habeas corpus."7 (Italics supplied.)
The Duhon case has thus settled our jurisprudence on two
novel, important issues. First, the inchoate offenses in Chapter V
of the criminal code are to be applied separately to the various
basic offenses of that code and other criminal statutes; second,
the remedy of habeas corpus will lie for one convicted of a non-
existent crime, even if there is a failure to exhaust the usual
remedies in the trial courtA
LEROY H. SCOTT, JR.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UN-
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTEs-Defendant was prosecuted under
Article 106 (2) of the Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942 "for hav-
ing in his possession with intent to display an indecent print and
movie film." Held, the obscenity article was so vague that it vio-
5. Opinion of Holcombe, J., p. 2.
6. State ex rel. Williams v. Klock, 45 La. Ann. 316, 12 So. 307 (1893); State
ex rel. Cayard, 52 La. Ann. 4, 26 So. 773 (1899); State v. Conradi, 130 La. 701,
58 So. 515 (1912).
7. State of Louisiana ex rel. Clarence Duhon v. General Manager, Lou-
isiana State Penitentiary, Nineteenth Judicial Court, Docket Number 29,390.
8. Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U. S. 442, 31 S.Ct. 44, 54 L.Ed. 1101 (1910),
holding that the remedy of habeas corpus was available for one who was
convicted at an unauthorized term of court; State v. Bush, 12 Ala. App. 309,
68 So. 492 (1915), holding that one held under a void warrant of arrest should
be released by habeas corpus; Commonwealth v. Frances, 61 Pa. Super. 445
(1915), where such a remedy was held available to one sentenced to the peni-
tentiary for an offense not punishable by confinement therein; Manning v.
Biddle, 14 F.(2d) 518 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926), where the accused was discharged for
the reason that he had been convicted and sentenced for an offense which
the court held did not exist.
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lated Article I, Section 10, of the Louisiana Constitution' in that
it failed to apprise the defendant of the exact line between crimi-
nal and non-criminal conduct. State v. Kraft, 37 So. (2d) 815 (La.
1948).
The courts, in Louisiana and elsewhere, have said that a
criminal statute must serve a dual function-that is, to notify
the persons subject to it of the conduct that will be considered
criminal and to serve as a guide for the adjudicative process. In
testing a statute for certainty, the courts determine if it is suf-
ficiently definite to theet these two requirements.2 A failure to
give sufficient notice will result in violation of both the Federal
and State Constitutions.3 When the language of a statute is too
uncertain to provide a comparatively definite guide for judicial
decision, the courts have held that it constitutes an invalid dele-
gation of the legislative function to the judiciary.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently had occasion to
consider attacks made on the constitutionality of certain articles
of the Criminal Code employing such broad language in defining
crimes. In State v. Truby4 the words "immoral purpose" were
held to be so vague and indefinite that they permitted the trial
court to formulate its own definition of what constitutes keeping
a "disorderly house." The phrase "to perform any immoral act"
was held to be an inadequate definition of "contributing to the
delinquency of minors"6 in State v. Vallery.7 In two precode
cases, similar language was held to be too indefinite.8 This does
not mean, however, that crimes can be defined only by a verbose,
detailed enumeration of all the specific ways in which the of-
fense may be committed. Broad language, if sufficiently definite
and certain, has been upheld in morality laws both before and
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusations against him."
2. See Note (1948) 62 Harv. L. Rev. 77 for a good discussion of the fac-
tors that vary the degree of necessary certainty.
3. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (due process clause); La. Const. of 1921, Art.
I, § 10.
4. 211 La. 178, 29 So.(2d) 758 (1947), discussed in (1947) 8 LOUISIANA LAW
REvIEw 129.
5. Art. 104, La. Crim. Code of 1942: "Keeping a Disorderly Place is the
intentional maintaining of a place to be used habitually for any illegal or
immoral purpose."
6. Art. 92(7), La. Crim. Code of 1942: "Perform any immoral act; ......
7. 212 La. 1095, 34 So.(2d) 329 (1948).
8. In State v. Comeaux, 131 La. 930, 60 So. 620 (1913), the words "indecent
assault," as used in La. Act 202 of 1912, were held too indefinite and vague
to constitute a crime. City of Shreveport v. Wilson, 145 La. 906, 83 So. 186
(1919), held that the words "lewd or indecent act" in a Shreveport ordinance
prohibiting prostitution and assignation did nothing more than make clear
the meaning of prostitution.
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since the adoption of the Criminal Code. In State v. Rose,9 a 1912
act defining a disorderly house as one where "lewd dancing" was
permitted met the test of certainty. The court said that the word
"lewd" has, "particularly when applied to dancing, the very well
and generally understood and unmistakable meaning."'10 Article
81, defining "indecent behavior with juveniles" as the commis-
sion of "any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the
presence of any child, with the intention of arousing or satisfy-
ing the sexual desires of either person" was held constitutional
in two recent cases, State v. Saibold" and State v. LeBlanc. 2 In
the Saibold case the court declared that the term "lewd or las-
civious" had, by itself, a sufficiently definite meaning. The court's
conclusion was reinforced by the fact that the definition is further
limited by the statutory requirement of a specific intention to
arouse or gratify sexual desires.
The problem in the instant case was to fit the definition of
obscenity into the pattern of Louisiana jurisprudence. Was the
definition in Article 106 (2) of obscenity as the production, sale or
possession of an "indecent" print, picture or model sufficiently
definite to meet the dual requirements of notification to the de-
fendant and guidance for the adjudicative process; or was it, like
the phrase "immoral," susceptible' of such varying interpreta-
tions as to fall short of an adequate definition of the crime? The
United States Supreme Court, in a recent case, 13 said in dicta
that the words obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or dis-
gusting were within the field of permissible uncertainty because
they were well understood by long use in the criminal law.'
4
There is much justification, however, for the Louisiana Supreme
Court's position that the words "indecent print," like the words
"immoral purpose," are insufficient unless they are further quali-
fied. 15
It may well be argued that the Louisiana Supreme Court has
9. 147 La. 243, 84 So. 643 (1920).
10. 147 La. 243, 251, 84 So. 643, 646.
11. 213 La. 415, 34 So.(2d) 909 (1948).
12. 213 La. 404, 34 So.(2d) 905 (1948).
13. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518, 68 S.Ct. 665, 671, 92 L.Ed.
654, 661 (1948).
14. 33 Am. Jur. 20, § 9: "While the statutes relating to obscenity do not
generally undertake to define obscene or indecent pictures or publications,
nevertheless the words usually employed in the statutes are themselves de-
scriptive, being words in common use and readily understood by persons of
ordinary intelligence."
15. In a recent Ohio case, State v. Lerner, 81 N.E.(2d) 282 (Ohio, 1948),
a statute prohibiting exhibition of obscene, lewd or lascivious books and
pictures was under consideration. The court said in dicta that what may
be a basic weakness in the statute is that it does not define obscenity nor
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been unduly technical in the Truby, Vallery and Kraft decisions.16
However, the decisions to date indicate that the supreme court
is not going to strike down all general definitions of crimes, but
will invalidate only those which it believes are entirely too broad
to serve the desired functions. The Saibold case17 illustrates ap-
proximately where the line is to be drawn. The supreme court,
in construing these statutes, must balance two conflicting con-
siderations. On the one hand, it is impossible for the legislature
to specify and define separately every type of immoral conduct
that it wishes to designate as criminal. At the same time a crimi-
nal statute must give clear notice to affected persons and serve
as a definite guide to adjudication. The reconciliation of these
two interests, especially with a new system of criminal law, has
posed some close questions. It is difficult to say whether a word
or phrase has achieved a well-understood meaning. It is a matter
of degree, and no. categorical test can be laid down that will
determine if a statute has exceeded the line of permissible un-
certainty.
The Louisiana Supreme Court pointed out in the Vallery
and Saibold cases that the word "immoral," standing alone, does
not sufficiently designate the prohibited conduct. In conformity
with this suggestion the 1948 legislature amended Articles 10418
and 92(7)19 to indicate that sexual immorality characterized the
offense sought to be prohibited. In upholding the comprehensive
theft 20 and gambling 2' articles of the Criminal Code, the Louisiana
say what it is in literature and to do so clearly is a legislative and not a
judicial function.
16. For a critical discussion of State v. Truby, see Morrow, Civilian
Codification under Judicial Review: The Generality of "Immorality" in
Louisiana (1947) 21 Tulane L. Rev. 545.
17. State v. Saibold, 213 La. 415, 34 So.(2d) 909 (1948); State v. LeBlanc,
213-La. 404, 34 So.(2d) 905 (1948).
18. La. Act 389 of 1948, amending Art. 104, La. Crim. Code of 1942 to read
"for any immoral sexual purpose," discussed in The Louisiana Legislation of
1948 (1948) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 47.
19. La. Act 388 of 1948, amending Art. 92(7), La. Crim. Code of 1942, to
read "perform any sexually immoral act," discussed in The Louisiana Legis-
lation of 1948 (1948) 9 LoUIsIANA LAW REVIEW 47.20. Art. 90, La. Crim. Code of 1942: "Gambling is the intentional con-
ducting, or directly assisting in the conducting, as a business, of any game,
contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby a person risks the loss of anything
of value in order to realize a profit."
This article was held constitutional in State v. Varnado, 208 La. 319, 23
So.(2d) 106 (1945). It is interesting to note in this connection the following
language used by Justice Fournet: "We know of no inhibition to the legis-
la#ure's authority to pass such a general statute so long as the offense
sought to be denounced is clearly defined so that the one accused thereunder
cannot complain if the particular acts with which he is charged fall within
this definition." 208 La. 319, 383, 23 So.(2d) 106, 127.
21. Art. 67, La. Crim. Code of 1942: "Theft is the misappropriation or
1949]
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Supreme Court has recognized the impossibility of embracing in
a statute every variation of the type of conduct prescribed as
criminal; and has sanctioned the use of broad language in de-
fining crimes, provided the line between criminal and non-crimi-
nal conduct is clearly and distinctly drawn.
ROBERT T. JORDAN
PRICE FIXING AGREEMENTS-PATENTED PRODUCTS-Defendants,
Line Material Company and Southern State Equipment Com-
pany, cross-licensed each other to use complementary patents
on an electrical product. The Line Material Company was author-
ized to sublicense on condition that the sublicensee maintain the
same price schedule as Southern States and other licensees.
Held, this violates the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.' "Even if apatentee has a right in the absence of a purpose to restrain or
monopolize trade, to fix prices on a licensee's sale of the pat-
ented product in order to exploit properly his invention or inven-
tions, when patentees join in an agreement as here to maintain
prices on their several products, that agreement, however advan-
tageous it may be to stimulate the broader use of patents, is
unlawful per se under the Sherman Act."'2 United States v. Line
Material Company, 68 S. Ct. 550 (U.S. 1948).
The conflict between the monopoly granted by the patent
laws 3 and the competition prescribed by the Sherman Act has
been recognized in a series of cases. The immediate problem of
price fixing under the protection of the patent laws was con-
sidered in United States v. General Electric Company and Be-
ment & Sons v. National Harrow Company.5 Both cases upheld
the validity of price fixing provisions in contracts between the
patentee and a licensee to make and sell. Although the decisions
suffered subsequent sharp attack,6 they were never overruled.
taking of anything of value which belongs to another, either without the
consent of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of
fraudulent conduct, practices or representations. An intent to deprive the
other permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation
or taking is essential."
This article was held constitutional in State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20
So.(2d) 368 (1944).
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
2. 68 S.Ct. 550, 564 (U.S. 1948).
3. 35 U.S.C.A § 31 and annotations thereunder.
4. 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192, 71 L.Ed. 362 (1926).
5. 186 U.S. 70, 22 S.Ct. 747, 46 L.Ed. 1058 (1902).
6. Kelley, Restraints of Trade and the Patent Law (1944) 32 Geo. L. J.
213; Note (1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 656; Note (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 567.
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